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Introduction
CBNRM has become such a dominant part of  development 
discourse that a focus on local group participation in 
natural resource management in which bona fide members 
receive benefits has come to be seen as ‘the right thing 
to do’. In practice, however, the objectives of  the plan 
and the processes that emerge are not always congruent 
(North 1990). CBNRM plans neither guarantee particular 
outcomes nor a satisfactory chain of  events that must 
occur as part of  the implementation process. There is 
little reason to celebrate changes in natural resources 
management strategies in southern Africa as revolutionary, 
as many pro-CBNRM commentators would make us 
believe; rather, these are incremental in practice (Hulme & 
Murphree 1999). Consequently, to regard such changes as 
definitively community-based is not only a misnomer but 
may lead to a crisis of  expectations. 
The 1980s marked increasing dissatisfaction with state-
centric natural resource management policies that had 
hitherto guided conservation practice. A bleak tale of  
resource degradation characterised most of  the countries 
in the South: soil erosion, declining biological diversity in 
terrestrial and aquatic resources, increasing desertification 
and an aloof  or alienated rural populace. This sad picture 
is attributed to state dominance in resource management. 
To obviate this state ineptitude, experts, especially from 
the North, made strong cases for the involvement of  
local groups in the management of  natural resources. 
Local groups, to these advocates, had the advantage of  
Although the last century has witnessed exciting strategies in resource management in the form of community-based natural 
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development debate on the role of the state, particularly in the context of the development of Africa. Stakeholders, located 
at different levels along the international, national and local continuum, have differing views on this debate based on their 
experience and ideologies. These positions determine the form and practice of CBNRM, through negotiation, contests, collusions 
and intrigue. Case studies of the implementation of CBNRM in Zimbabwe and Botswana show both opportunities in terms of 
community benefit and wildlife conservation, and risks in the form of domination of communities by NGOs, the state and the 
private sector. 
being rule-bound communities, making them malleable 
and robust resource management institutions. The state 
was seen as bad at managing natural resources and the 
community good. 
A focus on the community was thought to be 
democratising because it assumed that local groups would 
take charge of  the natural resources that they were in contact 
with every day. This was seen to be democracy from below 
in practice – the missing ingredient in developing country 
governance. It is easy therefore, to understand why donors 
gave the approach so much support. It addressed the 
political, conservation and developmental desires of  a wide 
spectrum of  actors. However, several questions emerge 
from such a perspective: what happens to the political 
economy that has shaped the context in which these 
local groups currently find themselves (Khan 1995)? Do 
external interests share the same vision of  the role of  the 
community? Is the community isolated from the regional, 
national and international processes that influence other 
developments within the state? 
This policy brief  examines the efficacy of  the community 
concept in explaining outcomes of  planned intervention in 
general and CBNRM more specifically. The primary aim 
here is to illustrate the point that a development project 
involves the interaction of  a broad network of  actors and 
interests. Local and supra-local actors seek to promote 
their interests in intervention programmes. An important 
way they do this is to promote or protect those institutions 
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we argue that an analysis of  the institutional landscape may 
help us understand how outcomes are configured. 
CBRNM in Zimbabwe
Through the Parks and Wildlife Act of  1975, the racially 
segregated Rhodesian state allowed the mostly white owners 
of  land held under private tenure to commercially exploit 
wildlife found on their lands. In general, this institutional 
change led to increased interest in conservation among 
white commercial farmers because wildlife was no longer 
a nuisance to them; it now had some commercial value. 
Because the Act was restricted to private land, Africans 
did not benefit because they neither had control over 
land nor could own any land. At the time of  Zimbabwe’s 
independence in 1980, wildlife made very little contribution 
to the livelihoods of  residents of  communal areas save for 
occasional poaching by some residents of  frontier areas. In 
fact some rural households sought to exterminate wildlife 
because it was considered to be one of  the causes of  poor 
harvests. 
After independence, the Act was amended to allow rural 
district councils (RDCs) to commercially exploit wildlife 
on communal land. This made space for the establishment 
of  the Communal Area Management Programme for 
Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE). CAMPFIRE aims to 
promote conservation of  natural resources in areas held 
under communal tenure. It is a CBNRM initiative that 
organises defined groups to collectively manage natural 
resources in an area and offsets the transactional costs 
incurred by these local groups by giving them financial and 
other material benefits. The programme assumes that local 
communities will be motivated to conserve the resources 
because they benefit from them in the same way that private 
landowners were motivated. 
At face value, CAMPFIRE satisfies the conservation 
objectives of  the state at the same time as satisfying the needs 
of  local communities. However, it cannot really be seen as 
CBNRM unless the state agencies are benign, disinterested 
parties. Also, its notion of  being ‘community-based’ is 
problematic because communities are not homogenous. 
Rural households cannot collectively adopt the objectives 
of  a programme such as CAMPFIRE. The programme 
therefore excludes certain parts of  the community and it 
excludes actors that may operate at the local level. 
In some ways, conditions in communal areas are similar 
to those on private lands, but there are a number of  crucial 
differences which have an impact on the conservation 
objectives of  programmes like CAMPFIRE. Wildlife is 
a fugitive resource, not a captive one. Decisions about 
cropping patterns, labour investment, disposal of  products 
and use of  farm and off-farm income are at the discretion 
of  individual households in both private and communal 
contexts. These decisions affect the transactional and 
opportunity costs that a management unit chooses to incur 
in respect of  conserving wildlife. But in a private land 
setting, the wildlife is privately owned, and in a communal 
area it is not. Households in communal area are therefore 
less likely to invest in wildlife conservation.
Boundaries on freehold farms are clearly marked on 
maps and physically demarcated with fences in most places. 
Apart from marking boundaries, the fences can be used to 
hem in, and claim property rights over, any wildlife within 
the confines of  the farm. This capacity to own wildlife was 
one of  the major institutional changes that emerged from 
the Parks and Wildlife Act. Private land holders responded 
to changes related to wildlife management mainly because 
decision-making over benefits and costs took place within 
the individual ownership unit. In the communal areas, 
boundaries exist and are recognised, but they are not as 
fixed as those on private lands. In contrast to lands held 
under private tenure, natural resources like wildlife, pastures, 
forests and rivers are neither privatised to any household 
nor to any grouping. These resources are common pool 
resources ideally under the control of  informal institutions. 
Wildlife is a fugitive resource and this is all the more so in 
communal lands where fences for common pool resources 
seldom exist. Under such conditions of  free movement, 
households cannot effectively claim ownership over the 
wildlife even though they may want to. It is clear in such 
contexts that attempts to define producer communities are 
at best difficult and at worst futile. Even if  an attempt is 
made to functionally define such a community, it is quite 
clear that the emerging management unit may serve to 
create rather than settle disputes over resource sharing and 
juridical control.
The CAMPFIRE programme is definitely more 
complex than economic incentives and conservation as 
the government’s policy document on wildlife suggests 
(DNPWLM 1991a). The producer community seems to be 
more imagined than real. At the policy level the RDC is 
considered a co-owner of  the wildlife with the community. 
Even if  we were to accept that the RDC is simply an 
institution of  local government, research clearly shows that 
there is a disjuncture between the theory and practice of  
decentralised rural governance (de Valk & Wekwete 1990). 
In a feasibility study of  wildlife utilisation in the Tsholotsho 
District, Murphree (1989:9) says:
We also heard complaints about inadequate communication and 
decision-making channels between the (Rural District) Council 
and the wards, and between the councillors and communities. 
“There is a communication gap – between the Council and the 
wards”, said one informant. This is not a complaint confined to 
Tsholotsho and can be encountered in many communal lands. 
Campbell et al. (2001) note competition between the RDCs 
and the communities that they purport to represent as a 
serious problem in the CAMPFIRE approach to CBNRM. 
Such observations call for a critical assessment of  how 
the CBNRM prototype operates in a scenario where the 
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RDC is involved. In reality such a planned development 
programme involves multiple actors and by implication 
multiple interests. Perhaps it can be argued that the wildlife 
policy implicitly ensures that an empowerment process is 
in-built in the methods; the RDC will involve the producer 
community. Cheater (1999), however, advises us to view 
such assumptions of  benevolent outsiders with caution. An 
analysis of  the outcomes of  CBNRM initiatives such as the 
CAMPFIRE programme call for more careful investigation 
of  the implementation process. 
CBNRM in Botswana
The CBNRM model adopted in the 1990s in Botswana 
was inspired by the CAMPFIRE experience. The Natural 
Resources Management Project (NRMP) was a bilateral 
venture between the US Agency for International 
Development (USAID) and the government of  Botswana. 
The NRMP aimed to involve rural people in financially 
productive management of  wild resources, both as 
managers and beneficiaries. The underlying hypothesis 
was that giving rural people a financial stake in the benefits 
derived through conservative (sustainable?) use of  wild 
resources would provide them with incentives to conserve 
those resources. 
The NRMP spent the period 1990–1993 on developing 
the strategic formulation of  an appropriate national 
approach to CBNRM. Botswana’s civil society sector was 
small and more or less centralised in the capital Gaborone. 
It also seemed that rural people themselves did not have 
the technical, organisational and management skills 
needed to manage natural resource management projects 
effectively. By 1993 the NRMP had decided that local level 
management would best be facilitated by assisting rural 
villagers to establish legally representative community-
based organisations (CBOs). It was further decided 
to endow these CBOs with management rights over 
significant wild resource areas, and then to assist them to 
enter into joint ventures with private sector partners. The 
Department of  Wildlife and National Parks (DWNP) and 
its NRMP advisors were expected to play a key organising 
and facilitating role. This approach was finally ratified in 
1995 by the government, and a co-operation agreement 
around the initiative was established between the Ministry 
of  Commerce and Industry and the Ministry of  Local 
Government, Lands and Housing.
The joint venture partner in this relationship would be 
a ‘for-profit’ tourism company that would operate more 
or less jointly with the village residents. Over time, the 
private sector partner was expected to transfer technical 
and management skills that would enable its rural village 
partners to manage the resource base on their own. In 
theory, the joint venture partner would provide field 
equipment, material, capital and expertise needed in a 
concessionary operation, while the community sector 
would provide the concessionary area. 
The details of  how profit-sharing or other methods 
of  remuneration had to be worked out before any joint 
venture was established, and community organisations 
would choose their partners after a tender process. The 
tenders were facilitated by the District Council Planning 
Office, representatives of  the DWNP, the Land Board, and 
advisers from the Natural Resources Management Project. 
The Technical Advisory Committee (TAC), comprising 
representatives from these offices, was established to short-
list and advise community trusts on the selection of  a joint 
venture partner. The final choice of  the partner would be 
made by the membership of  the community trust acting 
through a review committee. 
In almost all cases where the joint venture model has 
been followed, the CBOs have opted for a straight sub-
lease to a safari concessionaire. The concessionaire pays 
a large annual concession fee, and any manner of  other 
financially valuable considerations. These include:
• a certain percentage of  employment opportunities 
being filled from among the village community
• agreed shares of  meat from hunts
• free transportation
• a promised number of  small enterprise grants to the 
community organisation
• assistance with small development projects within the 
village or villages
• the construction of  community trust facilities in the 
village
• electrified fencing of  agricultural fields for village 
residents
• a funeral fund for village residents. 
The ability of  a CBO to provide its sub-leasing partner 
with a concession area and hunting quota depends on it 
maintaining its representative and accountable standing 
as a legal entity. It must also act in conformance with its 
deed of  trust and any other conditions and agreements. 
These are stipulated in terms of  the CBO’s management 
plan that forms the basis of  the Land Board’s allocation 
of  a head lease for the concession area’s resources, and 
the DWNP’s issuing of  the annual hunting quota for 
hunting concessions. Normally community trusts have 
been organised on the basis of  a simple deed of  trust with 
an executive board of  trustees drawn from the residents of  
the village and representatively elected. 
‘High-stakes’ opportunities have been created through 
CBNRM in the northern community trusts of  Botswana. 
These high stakes have created a complex arena in which 
elite factions contend for control within the village or 
community trust. The contest for control comes to be 
played out through the strategic manipulation of  village 
opinion, leading to the practical disenfranchisement of  
ordinary people, except as pawns, from the ‘community’ 
and ultimately to the disempowerment of  the common 
people to act as effective participants in civil society – much 
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less as committed conservators of  wild resources. If  elites 
have a predilection for becoming knaves, then what makes 
the commoners perpetual pawns?
High stakes and elite co-option
This structuring of  the CBNRM arena has created major 
incentives for town-oriented rural elites to once again 
turn their eyes to the villages. This caused many people 
who had settled in towns to frequently return home to 
participate in the community trust. Income from sub-
lessee concessionaires to the community sector through 
the various forms of  remuneration during the latter half  
of  the 1990s generally exceeded P500 000 (approximately 
US$100 000) per year in formal payments. Since 2000, 
total fees and formal financial commitments payable to 
the community trusts for hire of  their concessions and 
exclusive rights to resources have been on the order of  
P1 000 000 per year.
During the start-up phase for CBNRM from 1996, 
residents of  some villages reported that members of  
the elite who were employed in the safari industry were 
encouraged and given incentives by their employers to 
attend community trust functions. They also got involved 
in the activities of  the community trust to try to ensure 
that their employers stood a better chance of  winning a 
tender. But gaining formal control of  a community trust 
and its resources provided far greater potential gains than 
any incentive an outside agency could provide.
Within the community, elites stood the chance of  
gaining control of:
• vehicles and transportation
• processes leading to the allocation of  employment 
opportunities
• processes leading to the allocation of  training 
opportunities
• processes leading to the allocation of  citizen hunting 
licences
• the allocation of  meat derived from concessionaire 
hunting activities
• the implementation of  village-level benefit programmes 
(including such conditions as allowing or disallowing 
the granting of  credit in trust-operated general dealers 
and tuck shops and the use and equipping of  other 
trust-owned facilities)
• the expenditure of  large and small sums of  money (as 
well as executive control over the means of  expending 
and accounting for such funds).
As a broker with external agencies, elites stood the chance 
of  gaining control of:
• the responsibility to control the decision-making 
processes and flow of  formal information leading to 
the allocation of  community concession areas
• the ability to negotiate with concessionaires and 
representatives of  the private sector regarding 
temporary exceptions to the joint venture agreement, as 
well as for interpretation and amendment of  formal 
agreements
• the right to negotiate, treat, ‘define the situation’ and 
to represent the community stance with officers of  
government and donor agencies on behalf  of  the 
community sector.
Each of  these parameters of  control can be handled 
in ways that produce significant advantages for those 
responsible for their management and execution. 
It is nearly impossible for short-term social research 
to detect the extent of  class and wealth differentiation 
in any given village. More importantly, it is difficult to 
discern the extent to which informal power relations 
and influence affect decision-making by ordinary people. 
Further it is difficult to predict how and under what 
conditions incentives will arise, within changing social 
and economic contexts, for changes in behaviour that are 
antithetical to the common good. The public display of  
influence is normally shielded, and is likely to be discerned 
only during crises of  control, when the stakes are high. 
In contrast, programme research is seldom done. When 
it does take place, it is done once under pressure of  time 
and resources by people who may not be clear of  what 
they are looking for at the outset.
The situation is worsened by the relatively uncritical 
publications on CBNRM in Botswana. Where they 
have identified problems in governance, these writers 
have assumed that these issues can be resolved through 
remedial training. This contributes to the impression 
that problems are superficial ‘teething problems’ rather 
than fundamental structural problems with the CBNRM 
model that has been adopted. Although there is great 
promise in CBNRM for biodiversity conservation and 
for empowerment of  the rural sector, the fact that the 
same governance problems arise in various community 
trusts that something is wrong.
As practitioners we are learning what to look for: 
how to anticipate problems in the structuring of  
CBNRM processes, how to enable rural people to 
recognise the possibility of  these problems arising, 
and how to plan for and manage them. We have seen 
that rural people can acquire new skills and learn to 
apply them in a relatively short time if  they are freed 
from the fetters of  patron-client politics. The Kgetsi 
ya Tsie experience, based upon a series of  inter-group 
associations linking independent five-person resource 
user groups, and the experimental Shorobe Tebelopele 
Trust and its Kuchachaa photographic enterprises are 
both experiences in fundamental decentralisation into 
localised five-person management units. Neither involve 
concessions or the generation of  a ‘big pot’ of  money. 
Both have been developed over relatively long start-up 
periods involving ‘transformative education’ and both 
seem to have been relatively resistant to elite politics. But 
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experimentation takes time and focus, and it is not clear 
that the agenda and time frames of  international donors 
will allow for this. Nor is it sure that the mood of  those 
responsible for policy will allow the time needed to redirect 
the structure and process.
Despite the fundamental nature of  the problems, 
however, it would be an error to throw the baby out with 
the bathwater. Though we have no proven assurance in 
the case of  Botswana that the CBNRM hypothesis is valid 
– that is, that ‘giving rural people a stake in the benefits of  
wild resources will create genuine incentives to sustain and 
conserve them’ – it is a concept that makes good socio-
economic sense. Those in national and local government 
given responsibility to promote the smooth implementation 
of  CBNRM have often personally agonised that they may 
not be doing a good job, that somehow the failures of  
Botswana’s CBNRM approach may be their own failures. 
Instead, they should recognise that ‘the model’ that they 
have been tasked to implement is fundamentally flawed. 
The joint-venture model creates profound perverse 
incentives for co-option and manipulation that, in the 
context of  rural society and culture, and the immersion 
of  rural people as marginal players in a rapidly evolving 
cash economy, make any efforts to promote participatory, 
equitably-empowering development meaningless. 
There has been no test of  the CBNRM hypothesis 
in northern Botswana. It ought to be fairly tested, and 
ordinary people, including the poor, ought to be given a 
reasonable chance to play a genuine role as conservators 
and remunerated managers of  wild resources. We have 
learned a great deal about the strengths and weaknesses 
of  rural people and of  rural society and culture. It is time 
to use what has been learned, and to redesign the vehicle 
for CBNRM on wholly new lines, from the foundation up. 
Of  course, the major difficulty in this planning for change 
will then be the question of  how will the rural sector be 
represented? 
Conclusions
CBNRM is critically influenced by its producers, 
distributors and consumers. The donor fraternity considers 
it a truism that rolling back the African state and its 
various manifestations is a pre-requisite for development; 
transparency, accountability, efficiency. As a result, any 
development initiative is best done by the donor itself  
or by local partner NGOs on behalf  of  the community. 
Donors assume that the presence of  NGOs, regardless 
of  their (dis)honesty and competence is an assurance 
that development will take place. With the same line of  
reasoning, the NGOs find it necessary to create new 
institutions at the local level, in the form of  committees 
or CBOs. These local organisations are an attempt to re-
invent the local resource management institutions that 
were weakened by the colonial and postcolonial state. 
The state at local and national levels considers itself  to be 
the legitimate provider to communities and it is therefore 
opposed to any attempts by donors and NGOs to sideline 
its efforts. As an actor, the state uses its advantages as 
ultimate custodian of  natural resources, designer and 
implementer of  legislation, the development agenda and 
more permanent status to undercut the good intentions 
of  CBNRM. The state generally provides minimal support 
to NGO initiatives, if  any, and the spectre of  government 
taking over an initiative is always present.
The private sector, mainly in the form of  safari 
operators, has an intercalary status. It is in CBNRM as 
part of  its business as well as the fact that this sector has 
always been the traditional user of  wildlife for commercial 
purposes. As business people they use all possible ways 
to advance their interests, some morally and ethically 
questionable. Some of  the practices contribute to the 
nature of  CBNRM on the ground. CBNRM in southern 
Africa is based largely on safari hunting or consumptive 
tourism of  mega fauna. The private sector, for historical 
and organisational reasons, has been the most efficient 
at exploiting this option. However, the private sector is 
not a community development enterprise, primarily, and 
will therefore shrewdly ensure that it remains in business. 
This takes place against a background of  poverty-struck, 
sometimes illiterate and heterogeneous villagers and a 
state that is either suspicious of  CBNRM, or sees natural 
resource exploitation as a revenue source. As the dominant 
players, the state and the private sector will survive in the 
CBNRM arena, the community is less likely to benefit. 
This is not to suggest that communities are not active 
agents. Although constrained, communities will try to 
salvage what remains from the benefits of  the safari 
operator and local authorities. This may be in the form of  
protection from wildlife, game meat from safari hunts or 
employment opportunities. In some cases, the community 
will align itself  with the state and try to get it to play ‘the 
father’s role’ in patron-client relationships. Should CBNRM 
appear to be too complex, communities return to their 
other livelihood strategies, some of  which may compete 
with or complement the goals of  CBNRM.
Another feature is the ubiquity of  the NGO, not the 
state, as the driver of  the CBNRM. Why is this a pattern 
common to all CBNRM programmes? NGO participation 
in CBNRM is a microcosm of  the broader development 
debate. The presence of  NGOs in CBNRM is due to 
the availability of  donor funding. Donors fund this area 
because they doubt the capacity of  the African state, they 
believe the involvement of  the private sector is essential, 
and they see communities as clients in need of  a patron. 
However as the experiences of  southern Africa in general 
show, donor funding are fickle and, if  they dry up, the 
efforts of  NGOs will also dry up. This will leave local 
communities exposed, leaving the state to determine the 
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nature of  decentralisation in general and CBNRM in 
particular. The sequence of  this scenario is: state control 
of  resources, seemingly vibrant CBNRM with the support 
of  a donor, a suspicious or envious state, and a return to 
state control when the donor leaves. 
CBNRM involves a multiplicity of  actors at various 
levels. CBNRM policy and implementation is therefore 
a nexus of  various interests within and outside the 
community. The community should be viewed not as a 
homogenous entity, but as a complex unit with various 
functional and organisational features. CBRNM raises 
the question of  the role of  state and non-state actors in 
development. Lastly, actor choices are in the short term a 
product of  their reading of  the environment but that there 
is a distinct pattern or path in terms of  choices made. 
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